Aristocracy ll

 

This is a continuation of a discussion of how an aristocracy developed in the United States. 

 
 
The human trait--to look to someone else for advice, answers, or direction--will always exist.  Instead of attempting to change human nature, the Founding Fathers wrote, and the States ratified, a Constitution that severely limits the federal government's power.
 
 
Federalist Paper # 84 [paragraph 8-10]:
       ...The proposed Constitution is founded on the power of the people.  The people's representatives will execute it.  Therefore, a bill of rights doesn't belong in the Constitution.  The people surrender nothing.  And they keep everything.  Specific reservations are not needed.
     "We, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
     This recognizes popular rights.  And it is more effective than the large number of aphorisms that make up our State bills of rights, which would sound much better in a treatise on ethics than in a constitution of government.

9           A specific list of rights is even less applicable to a Constitution like the one under consideration.  It only regulates the general political interests of the nation.  It does not regulate every type of personal and private concern.  Therefore, if people use this point to oppose the new Constitution, the constitution of New York must be condemned.  However, both constitutions meet their objectives.

10         A bill of rights is not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would be dangerous.  It would contain exceptions to powers not granted.  This would give the government a good pretext to claim more powers than were granted.  Why declare that things shall not be done when there is no power to do it?

      For instance, why say that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained when no power is given to impose restrictions?  Such a provision would not confer a regulating power.  However, men who want to usurp power could use it to claim that power.  They might argue--with some logic--that it is absurb to say there is no authority when the Constitution has a provision against the abuse of that authority.  They could say that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press clearly implies that the national government has a power to regulate it.

     This is an example of the many handles that would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.

 

  

And the Constitution limits the most powerful federal authority, the House of Representatives, by requiring biennial elections.

 

 

Federalist Paper # 52 [paragraph 4-6,8,10]:

4           The representatives' term is two years.  We will consider two questions:

       (1)  Will biennial elections be safe?

       (2)  Are biennial elections necessary?

5          To maintain liberty, the government and the people must have a common interest.  The House of Representatives needs to both de­pend on the people and sympathize with their constituents.  Frequent elections secure this dependence and sympathy.  But it is impossi­ble to figure out how frequent the elections need to be.  Let us consult experience, the guide that should always be followed when­ever it can be found.

6           ...Great Britain seems to believe that three years between elections is the shortest period needed to keep representatives dependent on voters.  Even with elections every seven years and a limited constitution, Great Britain has some liberty.  Therefore, if our federal Representatives are elected every two years, they should feel dependent on the voters.

8              ...biennial elections will not endanger liberty.

10         Three things will strengthen [this] conclusion...

            First, the federal House of Representatives will have only part of the supreme legislative authority.  It is an important rule that, excluding all other circumstances, the greater the power, the shorter ought to be its duration.  And conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be lengthened.

            Second, in addition to being dependent on the people, the House of Representatives will be watched and controlled by the State legislatures.

            Third, we cannot compare the ability of the more permanent branches of the federal government to seduce, if they want to, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and the ability of the Senate to influence the House of Representatives.  Therefore, with less power to abuse, the federal representatives will be less tempted on one side and doubly watched on the other.

 

to be continued...

 

*quotes from The Federalist Papers: Modern English Edition Two, copyright 2008 by Mary E Webster

 

 

 

We Will Never Forget,  12/8/1941,  9/12/2001

 

 

Mary E Webster

http://Mary.Webster.org

The Federalist Papers: Modern English Edition Two is available on my website.

 

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